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Abstract 
In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information 
treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior 
information sets.  The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated 
hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and 
incomplete updating.  We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets.  We 
also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their 
pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning.  
This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy 
analysis.  
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I. Introduction  
It is important for the economics literature to understand how individuals assimilate new objective 
information about a good, asset or strategic choice and make subsequent decisions. Such decisions 
include their maximum willingness to pay for an improvement in environmental quality, or for a reduction 
in expected damages. While the economics literature often models agents as Bayesian updaters, other 
models of limited attention, confirmatory bias and asymmetric updating have been developed and 
supported with experimental evidence (Sims 2003, Rabin and Schrag 1999, Eil and Rao 2011, LaRiviere et. 
al. 2013).  Even though there is some support for each of these models in the literature we are not aware 
of any study which is explicitly designed to test for which model wins out in an experimental horserace.   
Significant design challenges exist in a lab environment to conduct such a horserace.  An experiment 
which tests for different models of updating would need to have agents receiving objective information 
about a good, asset or strategic choice in a manner which the economist can exogenously vary.  One way 
to introduce such conditions is to utilize stated preference methods in which agents are asked about their 
willingness to pay for a good or service immediately after receiving detailed information about it.  Agents 
must incorporate this information into their existing ex ante information sets when making stated 
preference decisions about their willingness to pay for some public good.  As a result, stated preference 
methods are well suited to test updating rules of economic agents in an economically meaningful context.  
Further, while the stated preference literature acknowledges the importance a previous experience and 
information, there is no paper which is able to identify the causal effect of information on WTP isolated 
specifically through learning.    
This study uses a large field experiment embedded within a stated preference survey to test different 
models of information updating and identify the causal effect of information on WTP isolated specifically 
through the learning channel.  The survey concerns a population’s willingness to pay for a mixed public 
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good: the regeneration of coastal wetlands acts as a form of flood protection but also provides 
biodiversity benefits.  One aspect of the good is that individuals living in flood plains are less likely to have 
their property damaged by flooding.  Another public aspect of the good is that reclaimed wetlands offer 
benefits in the form of increased wildlife abundance and biodiversity.   Importantly, the results of this 
survey are being used as part of the policy and management process for coastal flood defenses in 
Scotland, which makes the survey consequential for respondents, thus incentivizing them to truthfully 
reveal their demand (Vossler et. al. 2012, Vossler and Evans 2009 and Carson and Groves 2007).   
In the experiment, we compare three models of updating: Bayesian, confirmatory bias and bounded 
rationality.  We use a nine question multiple choice test over objective facts about flooding, flood 
protection and wetlands to elicit prior information levels from subjects.  We then randomly assign each 
subject to an information treatment (low, medium or high) based upon the number of questions 
answered correctly.  We then elicit agents’ willingness to pay for a single wetlands restoration project 
which is uniform across all subjects.  We test the subjects’ retention of this objective information and 
identify an objective updating mechanism by giving them the same (identical) quiz at the end of the 
experiment.  Importantly, we are also able to isolate how additional information, and subsequent 
updating, affects willingness to pay for the good over different levels of ex ante information.  Due to this 
exogenous variation in information, we are able to identify the causal effect of information on willingness 
to pay.   
Several important results emerge from the field experiment.  The results of the purely informational part 
of the experiment show that higher information treatments cause significantly more learning in subjects, 
even though that observed learning is incomplete.  This is somewhat surprising because due to our 
experimental design we are able to isolate the effect not only of providing information to subjects, but 
also that subjects learn and retain the additional information.  However, uninformed subjects who receive 
and learn little to no new information state similar WTP levels as well-informed individuals who receive 
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and learn all information.  Uninformed individuals who receive the most information, and who do in fact 
learn the most, are willing to pay the least for the good (e.g., significantly less than uninformed individuals 
who receive and learn little).  However, the behavior exhibited by subjects in the WTP portion of the 
experiment show that providing additional information to subjects does not alter their WTP in a way that 
is consistent with any of the proposed hypotheses considered in this paper.   
This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, we use a short questionnaire to elicit 
subjects’ previous knowledge levels about a public good and a second identical questionnaire which 
allows us to estimate the effect of treatment not only on WTP but also on actual updating behavior.  
Second, we are able to show in a field experiment that agents’ updating behavior is consistent with 
incomplete learning.  Third, we show that the amount of information given to agents relative to their pre-
existing information sets can have significant effects on willingness to pay estimates and that this occurs 
via the learning channel.  This final result is novel in the economics literature: while previous studies have 
identified choice overload of economic subjects, we identify “learning overload”.  
This last point has significant implications for stated preference valuation studies: we find that the amount 
of information given to subjects matters even though their exhibited behavior is not statistically different 
from Bayesian updating.  This could explain why many behavioral studies are at odds with exhibited 
updating behavior.  We find that the behavioral result doesn’t manifest in how the subject is learning 
information, but rather is a direct function of the amount of information received by the agent.  While our 
design is not capable of parsing the reason behind this finding, we catalogue several possible reasons in 
the discussion section of the paper.      
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two describes the survey and the experimental 
design in the context of the previous literature.  Section three presents results.  Section four discusses the 
results and concludes.   
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II. Survey, Experimental Design, and Hypotheses 
Our experiment has three key components.  First, the design allows us to test for how much information 
respondents possess about the good in question at the outset of sampling: that is, to measure their ex 
ante knowledge.  Second, the design also allows us to test how much of the new information is retained. 
Third, we are able to observe how a priori and new (retained) information affect willingness to pay for a 
public good.  This section describes the design in context of these components.   
Survey 
We conducted a field experiment in a stated preference survey in Scotland performed during 2013.  We 
set the survey in the context of current efforts by local government and the national regulator (the 
Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, SEPA) in Scotland to improve flood defenses along the Tay 
estuary in Eastern Scotland.  Local councils and SEPA are concerned that current defenses are not 
sufficient to prevent major flooding episodes, given changes in the incidence and magnitude of extreme 
weather events.  Residents also are concerned: we find that many people in the area purchase flood 
insurance.  
In considering their options for decreased risk of flood, one option for regulators is to encourage the 
conversion of land currently used for farming to re-build the estuarine and coastal wetlands which once 
characterized many of Scotland’s east coast firths and estuaries.  Such wetlands serve two major roles.  For 
flood protection, wetlands offer a repository for temporary episodes of high tides, and mitigate flow rates 
from the upper catchment which otherwise may cause flooding.  The amount of flood protection is 
commensurate with the size of the wetlands created.  Second, wetlands are a rich habitat for wildlife.  As a 
result, wetlands offer a non-market benefit in the form of increased recreation (wildlife viewing) to the 
local community, as well as providing a range of other ecosystem services such as nutrient pollution 
removal.   
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In order to gauge the public’s willingness to pay for restoring wetlands, we undertook a stated preference 
survey.  Subjects were invited to participate in the survey via repeated mailings and radio and newspaper 
advertisements.  Subjects who completed the survey were given a £10 ($16) Amazon gift card.  The survey 
was conducted online through a website we designed and operated.  Each subject who participated was 
given a unique identifier code.  In the stated preference survey we embedded the field experiment 
described below.   
Experimental Design 
The design of the stated preference survey was as follows: subjects were told that their responses would 
help inform policy and management of flooding in the area.  They were then given a 9 question multiple 
choice quiz.  The quiz was justified so as to inform policy makers as to how well this topic was being 
communicated to the community.  Respondents were then given objective information about  flooding, 
flood protection and wetlands1.  We then elicited willingness to pay for one specific wetlands restoration 
project uniform to all participants.  Finally, the subjects were given the exact same nine question quiz 
followed by a series of debriefing questions.  
In this survey, we embedded the following field experiment: we gave respondents of the survey an 
identical nine question multiple choice exam in order to elicit prior information sets regarding their 
knowledge about flood, flood protection and the public good aspects of increased size of wetlands.  The 
number of correct answers, the specific questions answered correctly and the specific questions answered 
incorrectly were recorded.  We grouped respondents into a priori types as a function of the number of 
correct answers: low (L), medium (M) and high (H).  A priori type L corresponds to 1-3 correct answers, 
type M corresponds to 4-6 correct answers and type H corresponds to 7-9 correct answers. 
                                                          
1 This information is available on request 
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After agents completed the exam and their answers were recorded, each agent was randomly assigned a 
treatment.  A treatment in our case was an amount of information about the attributes of the good.  
Treatments can be low (L), medium (M) or high (H).  Each treatment corresponds to a number (3, 6 or 9 
for L, M or H respectively) of bullet points and/or figures conveying precise and objective information 
about the issue or good.  Each bullet point and/or figure corresponds exactly to one question asked on 
the multiple choice questionnaire.  The quiz and complete set of bullet points are in the Appendix A.  As a 
result, after treatment assignment each agent can be summarized as a type/treatment pair in addition to 
information about their correct and incorrect answers.  For example, a type treatment pair could be MH: a 
subject who answers between four and six questions correctly and who is then given all nine bullet points 
of information (e.g., the high information treatment).  The experimental design is displayed graphically in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Experimental design  
Importantly, respondents were always given information they answered correctly first before any 
additional information was given as dictated by treatment.  For example, assume respondent A gets 
questions 2 and 7 correct and are in the L treatment. Respondent A is type L since they only got two out 
of 9 questions correct. The information set they would be provided consisted of two bullet points 
associated with questions 2 and 7 and, additionally, one information bullet point selected at random from 
the remaining 7.  Alternatively, assume respondent B gets questions 7-9 correct and they are in the M 
treatment.  They are type L since they scored three out of nine. Their bullet points would be the three 
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bullet points associated with questions 7-9 and three randomly chosen bullet points which correspond to 
questions 1-6.   
The reason for not randomly selecting information is that we are concerned with how agents are updating 
to new information.  In order for the experimental design to be valid, we must make sure that, on average, 
a type-treatment pair of LL is the proper counterfactual for type-treatment pair LM.  If the information 
treatment does not span the agent’s a priori information set (e.g., an individual’s type), then the proper 
counterfactual cannot be ensured.  Specifically, imagine the situation above in which respondent A gets 
questions 2 and 7 correct but their L treatment are bullet points associated with questions 3, 4 and 5.  In 
that case, respondent A could test as a type M ex post when their information set is elicited later in the 
protocol.    
 
Treatment 
H LH MH HH 
M LM MM -- 
L LL -- -- 
 L M H 
          Ex Ante Information 
Table 1: Type Treatment Pairs.  The x axis of the table represents the groupings (H, M, L, 0) by the first test score and 
the y axis represents the groups based upon treatment. 
 
One useful way to represent the type-treatment pairs and treatment information sets is shown in 
Table 1.  The x axis of the table represents the types (L, M, H) defined by the a priori test score, and the y 
axis represents the groups based upon treatment.  In general, there are nine potential type-treatment 
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pairs.  It is important to note, however, that some of these pairs may be uninformative.  For example, if 
someone has a high information level ex ante (type H) then they will learn no new information when given 
the low treatment.  Alternatively, if someone has a low information level ex ante (type L) then they could 
learn new information when given the high treatment and subsequently have any ex post information 
level (L, M, or H).   We therefore restrict ex ante H information types to receive only H information 
treatments and ex ante M information types to receive only M and H treatments to maximize power of 
the experiment and focus on the effect of additional information.  We also use one control in which 
respondents were not given a quiz beforehand, given the high information treatment and then quizzed 
afterward in order to have  a baseline which corresponds to most “standard” stated preference exercises.   
After the quiz, and before the information treatments, subjects were all given identical baseline 
information as to the potential cost of the policy and other background information given to all survey 
participants.  The information treatments were displayed after this uniform information.  At this point all 
agents were asked to select their maximum willingness to pay for the good – wetlands restoration – from 
a payment card of 20 different prices starting at zero and increasing to >$150.  They were only allowed to 
choose one of these values. After eliciting willingness to pay estimates the agents were given the exact 
same test as initially and their answers were recorded.  Finally, each agent was given the exact same quiz 
as at the beginning of the survey in addition to a set of personal characteristic and debriefing questions.  
Thus, at the end of the survey each respondent was summarized by an initial set of quiz answers (a priori 
information set), a type-treatment pair, a treatment information set (bullet points), two WTP responses, 
and a second set of quiz answers (ex post information set).  
Hypotheses 
Combining the initial quiz, the information treatments and second quiz allows us to test what information 
updating procedure individuals are using in forming their willingness to pay estimates.  This subsection 
introduces each type of updating procedure and shows how the information treatments allow us to 
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identify the updating rule used in the practice.  The baseline to be used as benchmark is that agents do 
not perform any updating, i.e., new information is irrelevant for both mean and variance of willingness to 
pay estimates.2 
Changing the information set of agents could possibly affect various aspects of WTP estimates. 
Previous literature shows that mean and variance of WTP have been shown to be influenced by changes 
in agents’ information set and that properly controlling for how information can influence such changes 
with stated preference data is important  (MacMillan et al. 2006; Aadland et al. 2007; Hoehn et al. 2010, 
Czajkowski et. al. 2013 and LaRiviere et. al. 2013).  While previous experience with a good and information 
provided during the survey may be important, the underlying updating mechanism is unclear. 
There are an increasing number of alternatives to Bayesian updating which have found support in 
the literature.  For example, models of bounded rationality, rational inattention and cognitive load have 
agents not completely adsorbing new information into their ex ante information set (Sims 2003, and 
Gabaix et. al. 2006).  Alternatively, there is evidence that individuals may filter additional information 
through priors in a way that confirms whatever bias they may have previously had (Rabin and Schrag 
1999, Eil and Rao 2011, and Grossman and Owens 2012).  While previous levels of familiarity have been 
shown to affect mean and variance WTP in a way that is not necessarily inconsistent with Bayesian 
updating, those studies are not designed to be able to parse between alternative updating models 
(Christie and Gibbons 2011, Czajkowski et. al. 2013, and LaRiviere et. al. 2013).    
                                                          
2 New information could also change preference (taste) of some attribute (and so the mean of random utility 
function coefficient associated with this attribute) or change variance of the taste for this attribute.  Put another 
way, new information could result in changing standard errors of a random utility model.  It could also influence 
many preference parameters, possibly in different ways.  For example, it could simultaneously change variance of 
ALL parameters in the same way, or influence utility function error term - this is scale – so the choices become 
more / less random if scale is heterogeneous in the population.  While these are important issues, in the current 
paper we restrict our analysis to updating behavior and simple mean WTP for the mixed good and leave these 
issue to future work.   
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Now consider the implication of the survey design on the ability to parse between which updating 
procedure agents are using.  For simplicity we estimate the following two equations: 
 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝑋′𝛾 + 1{𝐿𝐿𝑖}𝛤𝐿𝐿 + 1{𝐿𝑀𝑖}𝛤𝐿𝑀 + 1{𝐿𝐻𝑖}𝛤𝐿𝐻 + 1{𝑀𝑀𝑖}𝛤𝑀𝑀 + 1{𝑀𝐻𝑖}𝛤𝑀𝐻 + 1{𝐻𝐻𝑖}𝛤𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝑖   (1) 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = 𝑋′𝛾 + 1{𝐿𝐿𝑖}𝜔𝐿𝐿 + 1{𝐿𝑀𝑖}𝜔𝐿𝑀 + 1{𝐿𝐻𝑖}𝜔𝐿𝐻 + 1{𝑀𝑀𝑖}𝜔𝑀𝑀 + 1{𝑀𝐻𝑖}𝜔𝑀𝐻 + 1{𝐻𝐻𝑖}𝜔𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
 
In equations (1) and (2), X is a vector of subject specific control variables.3   
In equations (1) and (2), as before, the two capitals stand for the ex-ante score and the information 
treatment.  There are two left hand side variables which are considered separately.  The first is score and 
that specification measures actual learning that occurs conditional on ex ante information levels and 
treatment.  The second is willingness to pay (WTP) conditional on ex ante information levels and 
treatment.   
Score 
 It is important to understand the implications of treatment on information retention in order to 
reject the feasibility of various hypotheses dictating updating behavior.  One useful way to think about 
information pairs is summarized in Table 2.  Table 2 has ex ante information levels on the x axis and ex 
post information levels on the y axis.  There are three important features about Table 2.  First, there are 
three information pairs that should not be feasible if individuals can recall information: ML, HL and HM.  
For example an individual with an ex ante high information set should never lose information because 
they are reminded of a subset of information they already knew.  This is equivalent to assuming perfect 
                                                          
3 In the first specification controls act to verify that assignment is random.  Put another way, the average effect of 
additional information on scores (e.g., the various treatment effects) should not be affected by demographic 
control variables.  Conversely, when estimating the effect of WTP on the controls, it could be the case that the 
effect of additional information on willingness to pay could vary systematically with demographic characteristics.  
If those demographic characteristics are also correlated with preferences for the good, then adding in controls 
could affect the estimated coefficients of treatment on WTP.    
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recall and can be tested empirically.  Second, there are three information pairs in which minimal or no 
learning occurs: LL, MM and HH.  The effect of these information pairings on learning (e.g., the first 
equation) are the increase in score given by the estimated coefficients ΓLL, ΓMM, and ΓHH.  There are three 
information pairings in which learning must have occurred: LM, LH and MH.  The effect of these 
information pairings on WTP (or variance of WTP) are given by ΓLM, ΓLH, and ΓMH.  Third, it is possible for 
information acquisition to be incomplete.  For example, it could be the case that an individual of type L is 
given treatment H and has ex post information M.  Put another way, we cannot rule out respondents of 
summarized by treatment status LH but information status LM.   
 
Ex Post Information 
Hinfo ΓLH ΓMH ΓHH 
Minfo ΓLM ΓMM -- 
Linfo ΓLL -- -- 
 L M H 
          Ex Ante Information 
 
Table 2: Ex ante information and ex post information levels.  Importantly, the cells in this table do not necessarily 
correspond to any particular treatment.  This table represents all possible scenarios, assuming perfect recall, for how 
much information a subject can have after treatment assuming that each updating rule is feasible.   
 
Now consider the significance of coefficients which would be consistent with three different updating 
rules introduced above: 
 
No Updating –      H0: ΓLL= ΓLM = ΓLH>0, ΓMM = ΓMH>0, ΓHH>0 
In this case, only a priori information matters. 
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Complete updating –   H0: ΓLM = ΓMM >0, ΓLH =ΓMH = ΓHH>0, ΓLL≠ ΓLM ≠ ΓLH  
In this case, the information treatment fully determines ex post information levels.4   
 
Bounded Rationality –     H0: ΓLL< ΓLM < ΓLH, ΓMM < ΓMH 
In this case, type L individuals can learn but they can’t fully learn in the high information treatment.   
  
WTP 
 Conditional on learning, there is still a question of how prior information affects WTP relative to 
how additional information (e.g., being in one treatment versus another) affects WTP.  For example, it is 
not necessarily the case the two individuals that have the same amount of retained information after 
treatment have the same WTP for the good.  Given the design of this experiment, we can horserace 
different models of how additional information affects WTP.  To do so, we consider the three models 
below that use the WTP estimating equation (2). 
 
Bayesian updating –    𝜔R LH= 𝜔R MH = 𝜔R HH, 𝜔R LM = 𝜔R MM  
 
Subjects’ WTP is determined by the ex post level of information, assuming information is retained.  This 
assumes that information has a uniform effect (e.g., prior information levels don’t matter, only information 
levels at time of WTP elicitation).  
 
                                                          
4 Note here that we are only concerned with updating behavior.  As a result, the motivation for having different ex 
ante information levels is irrelevant.   
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Confirmatory Bias –    𝜔R LL= 𝜔R LM = 𝜔R LH>0, ΓMM = ΓMH>0, ΓHH>0 
In this case, the endogenous acquisition of information ex ante fully dictates how additional information 
affects WTP of agents.   
 
“Behavioral” Cognitive Load –   𝜔R LH ≠ 𝜔R MH = 𝜔R HH, 𝜔R LM = 𝜔R MM 
Regardless of the updating rule, there is a distinct behavioral reaction to being given significantly more 
information than the subject already has which is different from the what occurs during updating when 
the marginal amount of information is not as great.   
 
III. Results 
Survey and Questionnaire 
All participants for the survey were selected from the Scottish Phone Directory. Only people living within 
the local authorities affected by the flood defense scheme were selected to take part. In total 4000 
households were contacted by mail and invited to take part in an online survey. A reminder card was sent 
two weeks after the first contact attempt.  Of 4000 people invited 749 people completed or partially 
completed the online survey with 562 responses completed in sufficient detail to be used in the analysis. 
Such response rates are typical of mail-out stated preference surveys in the UK.   
Summary Statistics 
Self-reported socio-demographic statistics that the sample was representative of the local authority areas 
sampled in terms of age (χ2 (6) = 63.04, p < 0.01) and gender (χ2 (1) = 6.71, p < 0.01).  The mean income 
band was £20,000 - £30,000 and half the respondents worked full time (Table 1).  Not shown in the table, 
69% of the respondents reported being insured for flood damages.   
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Figure 2: Quiz score histograms by test. 
 
TABLE 3: A Priori Type – Treatment Pairs 
LL 153 
LM 56 
LH 55 
MM 91 
MH 82 
HH 10 
Control 79 
Note: n = 485 total subjects                                
                                                            
 
At the start of the survey each respondent in a treated group answered identical nine question quizzes 
concerning objective information about the good. This quiz was then repeated for all respondents after 
they stated their WTP for all subjects.  Figure 2 shows the histogram of subjects’ scores in quiz one and 
quiz two for all subjects who took both quizzes.  Figure 2 shows that there was a significant difference in 
the scores for quiz one (mean= 3.08, SD=1.76) and quiz two (mean=5.19, SD=2.23).  It is important to 
note that only ten subjects scored between 7-9.  As a result, there are only 10 a priori type H subjects 
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meaning there are only subjects in the HH treatment.  The complete composition of treatment and 
control groups is shown in Table 3.  We over sample from the LL type-treatment group in order to 
balance the power in estimating this treatment effect relative to the larger information treatments which 
are more common by the nature of the experimental design.   
Information, Learning and Updating 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (1) using both OLS and a left hand censored Tobit 
regression including and excluding various control variables.  The estimated coefficients represented the 
causal effect of being in a particular treatment group on a subject’s score on the second quiz.  The control 
group, all of whom received the high information treatment but did not take a quiz before the survey 
began, is the baseline.  In each specification, the control variables do not significantly alter the estimated 
treatment effects.  We take this as evidence that we properly randomized treatment. 
TABLE 4: Second Quiz Score on Treatment Group 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS Tobit 
    
LL -1.616*** -1.763*** -1.804*** 
 (0.336) (0.334) (0.341) 
LM -0.403 -0.590 -0.570 
 (0.425) (0.430) (0.434) 
LH 0.0689 -0.00115 -0.00786 
 (0.476) (0.445) (0.453) 
MM 0.256 0.107 0.132 
 (0.340) (0.321) (0.322) 
MH 1.053*** 0.999*** 1.023*** 
 (0.360) (0.345) (0.346) 
HH 2.797*** 2.340*** 2.357*** 
 (0.384) (0.373) (0.371) 
Constant 5.403*** 6.068*** 6.077*** 
 (0.301) (0.449) (0.450) 
 
Controls 
 
no 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Observations 485 458 458 
R-squared 0.212 0.280  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent Variable is second quiz score.  Control group is baseline.  Demographic control  
variables include categorical age, education, gender and flood threat variables.  Additional  
control variable for timing of when subject completed survey.     
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Table 4 shows that the control group, all of whom received the high information treatment, average 
between 5.4-6.1 questions correctly.  However, the MH and HH treatment groups scored significantly 
higher than the control group.  This is evidence that a key element of the treatment, taking a quiz before 
elicitation, increased attentiveness and retention, which we address in the appendix.   
 
Turning to the hypothesis tests for updating, we can reject the hypothesis that no informative updating 
occurs.  The null hypothesis that Ho: 𝜔R LL= 𝜔R LM = 𝜔R LH is rejected at the 1% level (F-stat of 11.09).  
Similarly, we can reject the null hypothesis that subjects exhibit complete retention.  The null hypothesis 
Ho: 𝜔R LH= 𝜔R MH = 𝜔R HH is rejected at the 1% level (F-stat of 18.03).  We fail to reject, though, the null 
hypothesis of bounded rationality by the strict definition given above.  It is clear from the coefficients on 
LL, LM and LH that information monotonically increases scores (similarly for MM and MH). We take this as 
evidence that our information treatments cause subjects to learn, but that learning is incomplete.  This is 
evidence that the experimental design for the causal effect of not just information, but also learning on 
WTP for the public good is valid.   
Willingness to Pay 
Figure 3 shows a histogram of all subjects who completed the survey.  Figure 3 shows that demand for 
this good is downward sloping and that subjects exhibit non-trivial anchoring around 50, 100 and 150 
pounds.  Importantly, though, there is significant heterogeneity in WTP for this good.   
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FIGURE 1: Histogram of WTP for all subjects.  N = 562.  
 
Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates of regression (2) with WTP as the dependent variable and 
treatment group (and controls) as independent variables.  As before the baseline is the control group, 
who received the H information treatment.5  The WTP for three treatment groups never differed from the 
control group: LH, MM and HH.  However subjects in both the LL and MH treatments exhibit significantly 
higher WTP than the control group across all specifications.  Further, adding in control variables alters the 
coefficient estimates of treatment on WTP.  This implies that the causal effect of information and learning 
on WTP is correlated with demographic characteristics which are also correlated with preference for the 
public good.   
                                                          
5 Also as before, some observations are dropped when control variables are included since some subjects chose to 
not respond to questions about where they lived and education attainment.   
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Turning to hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis that only information treatment matters for WTP is H0: 
𝜔R LH= 𝜔R MH = 𝜔R HH, 𝜔R LM = 𝜔R MM.  We fail to reject this null hypothesis (p-value = .25, F-stat = 1.39).  The 
null hypothesis of confirmatory bias is H0:  𝜔R LL= 𝜔R LM = 𝜔R LH>0, ΓMM = ΓMH>0.  We also fail to reject that 
null hypothesis (p-value = .18, F-stat = 1.61).  We also fail to reject the null hypothesis that all treatment 
groups are the same (p-value .37, F-stat 1.09) and or that the effect of treatment on WTP is jointly zero.  
Individual t-tests show, though, that the MH and LL treatment groups exhibited systematically higher WTP 
for the good.     
TABLE 5: WTP on Treatment Group 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES maxwtp maxwtp model 
    
LL 10.79* 14.38** 18.60** 
 (5.687) (6.034) (7.501) 
LM 11.60 15.22* 18.76* 
 (7.323) (8.194) (9.648) 
LH 9.824 2.286 3.989 
 (7.665) (7.678) (9.310) 
MM 5.815 5.524 8.860 
 (5.760) (6.196) (7.602) 
MH 14.43** 13.12* 18.80** 
 (6.834) (7.046) (8.261) 
HH 7.051 11.10 19.75 
 (10.16) (12.42) (12.86) 
Constant 30.45*** 42.65*** 29.69** 
 (4.301) (11.42) (13.45) 
 
Controls 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 525 458 458 
R-squared 0.011 0.169  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent Variable is WTP.  Control group is baseline.  Demographic control 
variables include categorical age, education, gender and flood threat variables.  Additional 
control variable for timing of when subject completed survey. 
IV. Discussion 
The results of the purely informational part of the experiment show that higher information treatments 
cause significantly more learning in subjects, even though that observed learning is incomplete.  The 
results of the WTP portion of the experiment show that providing additional information to subjects does 
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not alter their WTP in a way that is consistent with any of the proposed hypotheses considered in this 
paper.  This is somewhat surprising because due to our experimental design we are able to isolate the 
effect not only of providing information to subjects, and how subjects learn and retain the additional 
information.  In fact, uninformed subjects who receive and learn little to no new information (e.g., LL 
treatment) exhibit similar preferences to well-informed individuals who receive and learn all information 
(e.g., MH treatment).  Recall that we observe only 10 subjects in the HH treatment making inference 
challenging).  Subjects in all other treatment groups do not state a WTP that is significantly different than 
the control group, all of whom received the high information treatment.  Put another way, the subjects 
who learned the least from the survey and the subjects who learned the most from the survey were 
significantly more likely to be willing to pay more for the public good.  Subjects willing to pay the least for 
the good are those in the  
This non-linear causal effect of information on learning on WTP is remarkable.  Recalling that information 
causes learning in our experiment, subjects in the LL treatment have the least amount of information and 
MH have the most.  However both groups are willing to pay significantly more for the good.  Further, the 
causal effect of information and learning on WTP is correlated with demographic characteristics which are 
also correlated with preference for the public good.  There are two intuitive implications of these results.  
First, additional information and learning can alter WTP for a good if agents are not well-informed.  We 
find that in our case additional information and learning caused a decrease in WTP for the good.  This 
could be due to updating of preferences as a function of additional information.  However, we do observe 
that well-informed individuals (MH treatment) are also WTP significantly more for the good.  An 
alternative is “information overload” in incorporating new information on making economic decisions.  
There is a well-developed literature on choice overload (Iyengar and Lepper 2000).  However, it is less 
clear as to what the mechanism for this result.  For example, search costs have been posited as one 
explanation (Kuksoc and Villas-Boas 2010).  We find evidence for the channel associated with learning 
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about the good in and of itself.  We are not aware of any work in the economics literature which finds 
evidence for this channel.   
Second, we find evidence that information and learning can affect WTP for a good but that those effects 
are systematically correlated with demographic characteristics.  It makes sense that experienced decision 
makers, or decisions makers more accustomed to quickly incorporating newly learned information into 
their preference structure, are not randomly distributed throughout the population.  As a result, in field 
experiments, lab experiments and surveys in general, it is very important to take proper subsamples of the 
population in order to perform inference. 
More generally for stated preference studies, we find that agents do indeed learn about the good on 
stated preference surveys.  Our results suggest that learning this objective information about a good 
during a survey can significantly affect WTP estimates.  This is the first evidence we are aware of in the 
literature which isolates the effect of learning information on a stated preference survey on WTP 
estimates.  However, the way in which agents learn does no accord well with any well-formed theoretical 
model in the literature.  More work along these lines is clearly needed.               
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Appendix : Modeling Updating Rules 
We now introduce a simple theoretical model which shows the difference between these three 
classes of models.  Consider a model in which there are two potential states of the world { },x A B∈ . An 
agent trying to infer the true state of the world has a prior that the state of the world is A : 
( )pr x A ρ= =  such that ( ) 1pr x B ρ= = − . In our case, ρ  might be the probability an agent believes 
they are a high value or low value consumer for a good they have little experience consuming. In that 
case, A  may represent the level of utility from consumption if the agent is a high type and B  if the 
agent is a low type such that A B> . There are signals at a time period ts  which inform agents as to their 
true type such that { },ts a b∈  and ( ) ( ) ( )| | 0.5,1t tpr s a A pr s b B θ= = = = ∈ . Note that signals are 
informative but not perfectly informative given the support of θ .  
First, consider the properties of utility conditional on receipt of a signal given the above model 
given a prior ρ  that an agent is a high type consumer and they are a Bayesian updater. The expected 
utility conditional on the signal for a Bayesian updater is ( ) ( )| 1E U A Bρ ρ ρ= + −  with variance 
( )1ABρ ρ− . This variance is single peaked with a maximum at 0.5ρ =  and equal to zero for { }0,1ρ ∈
. As a result, the more informative signals an agent receives through consumption, the lower the variance 
from consumption as ρ  is updated based upon consumption experience.6  
 Second, while it is tempting to think that more information will always reduce the significance of 
noise relative to the deterministic component of utility, recent work suggests that might not always be the 
case. Gabaix et al. (2006) shows both theoretically and experimentally that agents making decisions under 
cognitive load use “directed cognition”. Directed cognition means that agents compute the expected 
                                                          
6 For example, in the model presented here, the posterior probability an agent is a high type conditional on 
observing a signal ts a=  is ( )( )( )1 1 1tρ ρθ ρθ ρ θ+ = + − − .  
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benefits of gathering new information relative to focusing on accurately processing the set of existing 
information in models of rational inattention (Sims 2003).  Because of cognitive load, new information 
would not always decrease error variance and, more importantly, the importance of new information can 
vary across agents in the economy if they have heterogeneous a priori information. Taken together, the 
implication is that agents less familiar with the good will have a larger error variance and the relative 
decrease in their error variance due to new information may vary as a systematic function of previous 
levels of information. Further, agents with a relatively complete information set may ignore new 
information in order to process their existing information.  
One reduced form model of rational inattention is to explicitly assume that there is a utility cost 
to processing new information. More formally, if using a signal ts  in forming a posterior distribution 
occurs at a utility cost C  then the expected utility in future periods conditional of processing a signal 
represented by a value function ( )1 1 |t t tV s Cρ+ + −  versus the value function without processing the 
additional signal ( )1t tV ρ+ . Sims (2003) shows that curvature of the utility function will dictate that it is 
rational to sometimes disregard additional signals due to the cost C  depending on the properties of ρ .  
It could be that additional information has asymmetric effects across the population as a function of the 
expected variation in utility (e.g. ( )1ABρ ρ− ). 
Third, additional information may not always affect agents in the same way conditional on the set 
of a priori information. Rabin and Schrag (1999) show that over-confidence can lead to agents responding 
to identical information in different ways. For example, if there is any chance that an agent can interpret 
information incorrectly and update their beliefs subject to the misperceived information, subsequent 
information may be perceived incorrectly with increasing frequency. The resultant “mis-informed” 
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equilibrium be driven by chance and as a result, the researcher may wish to be agnostic as to how 
information can affect changes in error variances for individual agents across the economy.  
Formally, in the Rabin and Schrag (1999) model of confirmatory bias, agents may misperceive 
signals and instead of observing the true signal ts , they actually observe { },tσ α β∈ . More precisely, if 
the agent’s prior shades toward state A  as the true state, 0.5ρ > , there is a probability 0q >  that the 
agent misreads a signal ts b=  as tσ α=  with probability q . As the probability of falsely interpreting 
information in favor of state A  increases (e.g., q  increases) so does the confirmation bias. Given a path 
of perceived signals { },n nα β , if at any point ( ) ( )| , | ,pr x A n n pr x B n nα β α β= > =  then further 
signals are biased. In the context of contingent valuation, then, the same information can lead to varying 
levels of relative certainty over preferences conditional on heterogeneous priors. 
All the behavioral models outlined above have the property that the variance in utility from a 
good conditional on a signal can be a function of amount of incoming information.  In a random utility 
framework, such as those often used in contingent valuation in which new information is presented to 
respondents, the implication of accounting for these behavioral issues is letting the idiosyncratic 
component of utility vary across the population. Formally, the implication is that the variance of utility 
conditional on an information set provided in a stated preference survey, I , and prior experience with the 
good, { },n nα β :  
 
( )( ) ( )
( )
var | , , var ' | , ,
0 var | , ,
i i i i
i
U I n n I n n
I n n
α β α β
α β
ε
ε
= +
= +
Xβ X
. (1) 
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Since there is no way to control for previous levels of experience, �𝑛𝛼 ,𝑛𝛽�, the above work in 
behavioral economics suggests that the variance of utility should be allowed to vary across the 
population. 
  
PART C: Effect of Treatment on Second Quiz Score 
We run the follow regression to identify the causal effect of taking a quiz before being surveyed on 
subject.  Since the control group received the H information treatment, we restrict the sample to treated 
individuals who also received the H information treatment (e.g., LH, MH and HH). 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝑋′𝛾 + 1{treated}𝛤 + 𝜀𝑖  (A.c.1) 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = 𝑋′𝛾 + 1{treated}𝜔 + 𝜀𝑖  (A.c.2) 
Output from these regressions is displayed in tables A1 and A2 below.  From Table A1, there is clearly an 
effect of being treated (e.g., taking a quiz before the survey) on second quiz score.  The implication is that 
the quiz causes subjects to learn more.  From Table A2, there is some evidence that being treated causes 
an increase in WTP for the good.  However, it is unclear if the increase is due to additional learning or if it 
is due to being treated.  Furthermore, adding in controls attenuates the effect of treatment on WTP in the 
OLS specification.  This implies that either learning or being treated is systematically correlated with 
demographic characteristics which are correlated with WTP.  Lastly, in order for our experimental results 
to be valid, we only need the effect of being in a treated group to be uniform across the population, 
which is a plausible assumption.   
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TABLE A1: Score on Treatment Status Given High Info Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS Tobit 
    
treated 0.808** 0.760** 0.770** 
 (0.353) (0.335) (0.338) 
Constant 5.403*** 6.592*** 6.626*** 
 (0.300) (0.659) (0.654) 
 
Controls 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 214 201 201 
R-squared 0.026 0.175  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent Variable is second quiz score.  Control variables include categorical  
age, education, gender and flood threat variables.   
 
TABLE A2: WTP on Treatment Status Given High Info Set  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS Tobit 
    
treated 12.20** 8.874 13.40* 
 (5.762) (6.458) (7.454) 
Constant 30.45*** 31.90* 15.74 
 (4.292) (17.28) (20.67) 
    
Controls No Yes Yes 
Observations 225 201 201 
R-squared 0.017 0.161  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent Variable is WTP.  Control variables include categorical  
age, education, gender and flood threat variables.   
 
 
  
